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Abstract
Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and
use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and
automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the
underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using
neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions
consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While
the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a
specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another
agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any
possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents,
a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution.
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Introduction
To successfully participate in social interactions, one must take
into account that people are guided by mental states, such as
desires and beliefs. Such ‘‘theory of mind’’ (ToM) abilities allow us
to predict and interpret others’ behavior based on attributed
mental states. Remarkably, human adults can attribute to another
person any possible mental state that they themselves can hold,
ranging from a belief about the location of an object, to more
complex ones that, for instance, a juror may have when inferring
criminal intent. ToM sometimes involves explicit and verbally
expressed reasoning about mental states, but it could also operate
implicitly and automatically without much deliberation.
According to a recent proposal the implicit ToM system
employs different representations than does the explicit system [1].
Such ‘two-system’ approaches assume that automatic ToM relies
on cognitive processes that are distinct from those employed by
explicit mechanisms that are manifested in judgments of veridi-
cality of others’ beliefs. In this view, only the latter can be
considered proper ToM, while the implicit system is considered as
a precursor. Alternatively, it was argued that implicit mental
attributions reflect proper ToM, and their fast and efficient
mechanisms may be crucial for real-life interactions from early on
[2–4]. However, while there is extensive behavioral and neuro-
imaging research on explicit ToM, the functional properties and
the underlying neural mechanisms of implicit ToM are less clear.
Neuroimaging research targeting explicit ToM reasoning has
provided extensive evidence suggesting that a consistent set of
brain regions is recruited when participants are required to reason
about other people. This brain network (also termed social brain
network or mentalizing network) includes the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the
superior temporal sulcus (STS), precuneus (PC) and the temporal
poles [5–11]. In particular, two brain areas within the social brain
network have been claimed to be crucial for ToM, namely the TPJ
and MPFC. These brain areas are assumed to have well defined
roles in reasoning about other people’s mental states. Specifically,
Frith & Frith [7] have argued that the MPFC is involved in
decoupling mental states from physical state representations and
according to Saxe [12] the right TPJ is selectively involved in
reasoning about other’s representational mental states.
However, most neuroimaging studies investigating ToM have
employed paradigms following the standard false belief tasks,
which require off-line deliberate reasoning and explicit and often
verbal predictions based on mental states. A few investigations
have used online or implicit tasks that elicited attributing goals to
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other agents, perspective taking or involved moral judgments, and
reported the involvement of the social brain network in these tasks,
such as the MPFC, or the TPJ, PC and STS regions [13–16].
Studies have also implemented methods where participants had an
apparently unrelated task, but the situation could implicitly elicit
thinking about other people. For instance, presentations of static
natural scenes containing people while making simple category
judgments (e.g., animal/vegetable) activated parts of the mentaliz-
ing network, specifically, the dorsomedial PFC and temporal poles
[17]. Other studies, using online virtual reality tasks such as
driving a taxi, found an increased activity in the right posterior
STS, MPFC and right temporal pole for the events participants
reported offline that they were engaged in thinking about other
people [18]. Further investigations have addressed the question
whether spontaneous trait inferences recruit the same brain
networks as intentional inferences, revealing the involvement of
the MPFC for both [19]. While most of these paradigms targeting
implicit social cognition required attributing goals, traits or
intentionality, rather than attributing representational mental
states (i.e., beliefs) to other agents, in the present study we use a
paradigm that directly taps on spontaneous computations
concerning an agent’s false beliefs.
In a recent behavioral study investigating automatic ToM
mechanisms, Kova´cs et al. [4] found that adults spontaneously
tracked an agent’s belief about a location of an object, even when
the agent and his beliefs were completely irrelevant for their task.
The participants’ task was to detect the presence of an object, and
their own belief that the object was present at a target location
facilitated their performance. Importantly, object detection was
also speeded when an additional observer, based on the perceptual
input that was accessible for him, could have entertained the belief
that the object was present, even though participants later
observed the object having left the scene.
Two aspects of these results deserve closer attention. First,
facilitation occurred without the instruction to encode the
observer’s belief. This suggests that tracking the epistemic states
of others, just like tracking others’ behavior in joint action [20]
may be automatic [21]. Second, the above study of Kova´cs et al.
[4] found asymmetric effects: While the detection of the object was
facilitated by the false belief of the other observer that the object
was present, the observer’s belief about the opposite state of affairs
(i.e., that the ball was absent) did not interfere with object
detection. Such an asymmetry might have been due to task
demands, which required participants to respond only to the
presence of the target, but not to its absence. However, it is also
possible that this asymmetry is a functional characteristic of the
implicit belief tracking system, which leads to preferential
encoding of certain types of belief contents, while ignoring others
in specific situations. The implicit ToM system may be specialized
to track false beliefs about the presence, but not about the absence
of objects.
In the current study we investigate implicit ToM by using
functional MRI and a literature-based region of interest (ROI)
approach. If automatic belief tracking recruits the same represen-
tational systems as explicit judgments, we expect that core brain
regions previously reported to be active for explicit ToM tasks (i.e.
MPFC and TPJ) to be also active in an implicit ToM task.
Furthermore, by measuring brain activation during implicit belief
tracking we can investigate whether the asymmetric sensitivity to
false beliefs about the presence, but not the absence of objects
reflects a genuine content-selectivity of the implicit system. We
reasoned that if brain regions that are known to reflect belief
attribution are active when an observer should think that an object
is at a location (though it is not), and are not active when the
observer should think that the object is not at a location (though it
is), it would be evidence for the claim that automatic ToM tracks
only specific kinds of beliefs (that is, beliefs with positive content,
e.g., object at location, but not with negative content, e.g., object
not at location).
Materials and Methods
We recorded BOLD signal while participants were lying in the
MRI scanner watching short movies, in which the movements of
an agent, an occluder, and a ball were arranged to give rise to
various potential belief contents to the agent. Like in the original
study by Kova´cs et al. [4], participants were not required to
monitor the agent’s beliefs. However, unlike in the original study,
they had to respond to both the presence and the absence of the
ball (eliminating the asymmetry of task demands).
Participants
Fifteen healthy students (6 male; age: mean= 21.6, ranging
from 18 to 27) participated on the basis of written informed
consent. The study was conducted according to the Declaration of
Helsinki, with approval of the local ethics committee of the
University Hospital Gent. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. No subject had a history of neurological, major
medical, or psychiatric disorder. All participants were right-
handed as assessed by the Edinburgh handedness questionnaire
(mean score = 92).
Design and stimuli
Participants were lying in the MRI scanner while watching
short videos via a mirror. We have adapted the design and stimuli
from Experiment 1 of Kova´cs et al. [4] with the modifications
described below. We have used the same movies, except that they
were 25% faster in this study, and we introduced a variable jitter
between the two phases. All movies consisted of two phases: the
belief formation phase and the outcome phase. Since we were
specifically interested in the neural correlates of implicit belief
formation, we introduced a variable jitter interval of 2, 3.5, 5, 6.5,
8, or 9.5 seconds between the two phases.
The movies in the belief formation phase differed along two
aspects of the belief attributable to the agent: Content (Positive:
ball present vs. Negative: ball absent) and Veridicality (True:
matching reality vs. False: mismatching reality). Combined with
the two versions of the outcome phase (ball does or does not
appear from behind the occluder), there were 8 different trials, 6
jitter intervals, and movies were repeated twice during the study in
a random order resulting in a total of 96 experimental trials. In
addition, we inserted 12 null events consisting of a blank screen
presented for the entire trial length.
Belief formation phase. As shown in Figure 1, all movies
started with an agent placing a ball on a table in front of an
occluder. Then the ball rolled behind the occluder. Following this,
the movies could continue in four ways depending on the
experimental conditions:
1. In the True Belief-Positive Content condition, the ball rolled
out of the scene from behind the occluder, and then rolled back
behind the occluder (ball last seen by the participant at 10 s;
time information is given relative to the beginning of the movie)
in the agent’s presence. The agent left the scene at 11 s. Thus,
the agent could rightly believe the ball to be behind the
occluder.
2. In the True Belief-Negative Content condition, the ball
emerged from behind the occluder without leaving the scene,
Content Selectivity in Implicit Mentalizing
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then rolled back behind the occluder, and finally left the scene
(ball last seen at 10 s), all in the agent’s presence. The agent left
the scene at 11 s. Thus, the agent could rightly believe the ball
not to be behind the occluder.
3. In False Belief -Positive Content condition, we reversed the
order of when the ball and the agent left the scene, respectively,
relative to the True Belief –Negative Content condition. Thus,
the agent left the scene at 6 s. Then, the ball emerged from
behind the occluder without leaving the scene, rolled back
behind the occluder, and finally left the scene (ball last seen at
11 s), all in the agent’s absence. Thus, the agent could wrongly
believe the ball to be behind the occluder.
4. In the False Belief-Negative Content condition, the ball rolled
out of the scene from behind the occluder in the agent’s
presence. Then, the agent left the scene at 9 s. In his absence,
the ball rolled back behind the occluder at 11 s. Thus, the
agent could wrongly believe the ball not to be behind the
occluder.
Outcome phase. At the end of each movie, the agent re-
entered the scene and the occluder was lowered. The four
conditions were paired with two outcomes, in which the ball was
either present or absent behind the occluder. Participants were
instructed to press one key when they detected the ball, and
another key when they detected that the ball was not there (see
Supporting Information, Additional analysis S1). Unlike in the
Kova´cs et al. study [4], participants did not press a button when
the agent left the scene, as we aimed to measure BOLD signal in
the belief formation phase without possible movement artifacts. It
is important to note that the required two alternative choice
response (ball present/ball absent) in the outcome phase differed
from that of Kova´cs et al. [4], where a detection (go-nogo) task was
used rather than a choice response task. We changed the response
in order to equate manual responses for ball presence and absence,
and to make each outcome equally relevant. The ball was present
in 50% of the trials in all conditions. Importantly, the agent’s
beliefs were never mentioned and were irrelevant to the task. As
we were interested in belief attribution processes, we restricted our
Figure 1. The logical structure of events in the experimental conditions. In the figure only the critical events are depicted, specifically, the
final location of the ball and whether the agent was present or not when the event leading the outcome occurred (for the exact events and the
timing see Methods).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106558.g001
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analyses to the four conditions defined by the belief formation
phase, independently of the outcome.
MRI-Scanning Procedure
Images were collected with a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using an
8-channel radiofrequency head coil. First, high-resolution ana-
tomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE
sequence (TR=2530 ms, TE= 2.58 ms, TI = 1100 ms, acquisi-
tion matrix = 25662566176, sagittal FOV=220 mm, flip an-
gle = 7u, voxel size = 0.8660.8660.9 mm3). Whole brain function-
al images were collected using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence
sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR=2000 ms, TE= 35 ms, image
matrix = 64664, FOV=224 mm, flip angle = 80u, slice thick-
ness = 3.0 mm, distance factor = 17%, voxel size 3.563.563 mm3,
30 axial slices). Volumes aligned to AC-PC.
FMRI analysis
The fMRI data were analysed with statistical parametric
mapping using SPM5 software (Wellcome Department of Cogni-
tive Neurology, London, UK). The first 4 volumes of all EPI series
were excluded from the analysis to allow the magnetisation to
approach a dynamic equilibrium. Data processing started with
slice time correction and realignment of the EPI datasets. A mean
image for all EPI volumes was created, to which individual
volumes were spatially realigned by rigid body transformations.
The high-resolution structural image was co-registered with the
mean image of the EPI series. Then the structural image was
normalised to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template,
and the normalisation parameters were applied to the EPI images
to ensure an anatomically informed normalisation. During
normalisation the anatomy image volumes were resampled to
16161 mm3. A filter of 8 mm FWHM (full-width at half
maximum) was used. Low-frequency drifts in the time domain
were removed by modelling the time series for each voxel by a set
of discrete cosine functions to which a cut-off of 128 s was applied.
The subject-level statistical analyses were performed using the
general linear model (GLM). The model contained separate
regressors for all possible combinations of Veridicality (True vs.
False), Content (Positive vs. Negative), phase (belief vs. outcome)
and actual presence of the ball (present/absent) (duration of
0 seconds) resulting in 16 regressors in total. The percent signal
change was extracted for the whole duration of the events of
interest. Movement parameters were included to account for
variance associated with head motion. All resulting vectors were
convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response function
(HRF) and its temporal derivative to form the main regressors in
the design matrix (the regression model). The statistical parameter
estimates were computed separately for each voxel for all columns
in the design matrix.
The coordinates reported correspond to the MNI coordinate
system.
Literature based ROIs in TPJ and MPFC. In order to
obtain a ROI of TPJ and MPFC we conducted an activation-
likelihood estimation (ALE) [22] meta-analysis on 26 studies on
mentalizing that reported 31 peaks of activation in the proximity
of TPJ and 31 in MPFC [23]. We used a threshold of FDR p,
0.01 and a cluster size above 200 mm3. The cluster identified in
TPJ was centred around the coordinate 56–47 33 (cluster size:
4448 mm3) and we used the mirrored ROI for the localization of
left TPJ whereas the literature-based MPFC ROI was located at 2
53 13 (cluster size: 3368 mm3). Separately for each subject, each
literature-based ROI, and each condition, the mean percent signal
change over a time window of 4–13 s after stimulus onset was
extracted (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) [24] and used for
further analysis.
Results
We carried out signal-change analyses in the a-priori defined
ROIs based on a meta-analysis of peaks reported in 26 studies on
mentalizing. In right TPJ we found a main effect of belief
(F(1,14) = 6.34, p= .025). Participants showed higher activation
values for false than for true beliefs. Furthermore, there was a
statistical trend for a main effect of content (F(1,14) = 4.37,
p = .055). Importantly, a significant interaction effect of belief and
content was found (F(1,14) = 5.35, p = .036) (Fig. 2A). Post-hoc t-
tests revealed significant differences between the False Belief,
Positive Content condition and all other conditions (True Belief,
Negative Content: t(14) =23.65, p,0.01; True Belief, Positive
Content: t(14) =22.64, p,0.05; False Belief, Negative Content:
t(14) =23.0, p,0.01).
In the left TPJ we did not observe any significant activation
differences (Belief: F(1,14) = 0.22, p= .645, Content:
F(1,14) = .784, p = .391, Belief*Content: F(1,14) = 1.09, p = .313).
Furthermore, the signal-change analyses in the literature based
MPFC ROI did not reveal any significant main effects (Belief:
F(1,14) = 2.20, p = .160, Content: F(1,14) = 3.30, p = .091). Inter-
estingly, however, it also showed a significant interaction of belief
and content (Belief*Content: F(1,14) = 4.79, p= .046) (Fig. 2B).
Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant differences between True
Belief, Positive Content and True Belief, Negative Content
(t(14) =22.0, p,0.01) as well as False Belief, Positive Content
(t(14) =22.58, p,0.05), the difference to False Belief, Negative
Content only revealed a tendency (t(14) =21.98, p= 0.068).
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to investigate two questions
regarding the mechanisms and the underlying neural substrates of
implicit belief tracking. One question was related to the neural
mechanism of implicit ToM, and the other concerned the
potential content selectivity of the implicit system. Regarding the
first question, we found that implicit belief tracking, similarly to
what is repeatedly found in studies targeting explicit ToM
reasoning, recruits right TPJ and MPFC regions.
The finding that the right TPJ is only active when a false belief
attributed to another person has a positive content reveals a crucial
functional characteristic of the automatic belief tracking system,
more specifically, a genuine content selectivity. This implies that
spontaneous belief tracking may be initiated only for certain types
of belief contents. When this content is about the occurrence of an
object at a certain location, a positive content is attributed, while
potential beliefs with negative content are ignored. One possible
explanation for such pattern could be that this system may
represent only false beliefs about the presence of an object (e.g., ‘he
believes the ball is there’) because only these yield definite
transitive action predictions related to the represented object,
while false beliefs about the absence of an object (e.g., ‘he believes
the ball is not there’) do not allow such predictions. Although we
are certainly able to explicitly attribute to others any possible belief
that we ourselves can entertain, including beliefs about the absence
of objects (negative content), we conjecture that these might pose
representational demands that the implicit system is not prepared
to tackle.
Alternatively, such a limitation of the spontaneous belief
tracking system may stem from the conflicting relation between
the content of one’s own reality representation and that of an
attributed belief. According to this possibility, one would
Content Selectivity in Implicit Mentalizing
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spontaneously track someone else’s belief only when one does not
have a strong competing own belief. Thus, in our case one would
compute the belief of the agent in the condition where one believes
nothing to be present behind the occluder, but not when one
believes the ball to be behind the occluder. While it is difficult to
separate the two alternatives with the current design, data from
other studies with infants and adults seem to support the
interpretation that the limitation may be related to the negative
belief content. Indeed, both infants and adults seem to spontane-
ously track others’ beliefs and perspective even if these are strongly
competing with their own representations [25,10].
On the other hand, the MPFC was more active in the condition
where both the participant and the agent believed that the ball was
behind the occluder (true belief with a positive content). Recent
studies have found that the MPFC is recruited in situations where
an actor searches in a location where an object is present
compared to an empty location [26]. While there was no explicit
object search induced in the present task, we have also found a
higher activation pattern in the condition where both the
participant and the agent believed that the object was behind
the occluder, thus allowing for a possible search. Furthermore, this
higher MPFC activation pattern in the true belief- object present
condition is also in line with proposals suggesting that the MPFC is
involved in reasoning about triadic relations between Me, You and
an object [12], but might not be selectively recruited for attributing
representational mental states [27,28]. Indeed, in the present
study, using an implicit belief attribution task that is analogous to
earlier used explicit ToM task, we found an activation of the
MPFC in the true belief - object present condition, but not in the
false belief conditions. Earlier studies have found that the MPFC is
involved in representing various characteristics of other agents
besides their beliefs, such as their appearance and emotions
[27,28] or a viewpoint-independent perspective selection [15].
While in the last years there seems to be more consensus on the
selective role of the right TPJ in processing mental states with
representational content [12,27,29], researchers have also pro-
posed that right TPJ activity may not be selective for social
cognition, as both ToM and attentional reorienting tasks were
found recruit this area [30]. Additionally, research has shown that
the TPJ and the MPFC are also associated with self-other
distinction [23]. Our finding that implicit ToM seems to recruit
the right TPJ is consistent with what is usually found using explicit
ToM tasks, although the left TPJ might also play a role in ToM
reasoning, as lesion studies have reported that damage to left TPJ
is associated to deficits on explicit ToM tasks [31–33].
One might wonder whether the implicit vs. explicit distinction is
warranted in ToM research, as it is unclear whether it refers to the
nature of the task or to the underlying cognitive processes, and we
concur with such worries. After all, one could argue that even in
our study participants could have spontaneously engaged in
explicit, besides implicit, mentalizing, even if they were not
instructed to do so. However, if our participants recruited similar
computations as the participants in the Kova´cs et al. [4] study,
where equivalent belief tracking effects were found in adults and
infants, than given that young infants are thought to lack an
explicit belief tracking system, one could argue that our
participants most likely have relied on their implicit ToM system
as well. Additionally, according to standard views, explicit ToM, in
contrast to implicit ToM, should be effortful, highly dependent on
cognitive resources and occur offline [1]. However, since we
measured the BOLD signal online as the belief scenario unfolded,
we find it unlikely that participants could have engaged in explicit
and effortful ToM processes. While we did not systematically
debrief the participants in the present study, in the earlier Kova´cs
et al. study participants reported that they had believed the agent
to be irrelevant or that it was a mere distractor [4] (Supplementary
Material, Additional analysis S1, p. 5).
Furthermore, regarding the issue of automaticity in mental state
reasoning, earlier studies have found a modulation of the
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex by cognitive load when participants
were instructed to think of the reasons why a character might
perform specific actions [34]. In a framework where automaticity
is not seen a unitary construct but instead as comprising a set of
relatively independent dimensions, such as efficiency, awareness,
intention, and control [35], our study seems to speak mostly to the
intention and awareness dimensions, as participants were not
instructed to intentionally track the agent’s beliefs (and were likely
not aware of doing so).
In summary, our findings suggest that the mechanisms
underlying the automatic tracking of others’ beliefs exploit partly
similar representational systems as explicit ToM judgments do.
Furthermore, we have found evidence for a content-dependent
representational constraint on implicit ToM, which restricts the
system to tracking false beliefs that may allow fast and efficient
predictions about others’ actions. Such a content-selectivity
favoring potential behaviorally relevant beliefs may represent the
signature limit of the implicit ToM system and may signal a
functional difference between implicit and explicit ToM attribu-
tions.
Figure 2. ROI mean percent signal change analysis for the right TPJ (A) and the amPFC (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106558.g002
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